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“How could you even ask that?”:
Moral considerability, uncertainty and
vulnerability in social robotics
Alexis Elder
University of Minnesota Duluth
When it comes to social robotics (robots that engage human social responses via
“eyes” and other facial features, voice-based natural-language interactions, and
even evocative movements), ethicists, particularly in European and North
American traditions, are divided over whether and why they might be morally
considerable. Some argue that moral considerability is based on internal
psychological states like consciousness and sentience, and debate about
thresholds of such features sufficient for ethical consideration, a move sometimes
criticized for being overly dualistic in its framing of mind versus body. Others,
meanwhile, focus on the effects of these robots on human beings, arguing that
psychological impact alone can qualify an entity for moral status. What both sides
overlook is the importance for ordinary moral reasoning of integrating questions
about an entity’s “inner life,” and its psychological effect on us. Turning to accounts
of relationships in virtue ethics, especially those of the Confucian tradition, we find
a more nuanced theory that can provide complex guidance on the moral
considerability of social robots, including ethical considerations about whether and
how to question this to begin with.

Keywords: social robotics, moral considerability, Confucian ethics, moral
status, virtue ethics

Asking the right questions
Imagine yourself in a heated discussion with a friend or family member. As
the conversation devolves, you each ask more and more pointed
questions, until finally, one of you (let’s say it’s you) challenges the other’s
standing, and the other person exclaims, “How could you even ask that?”
Depending on how one fills in the details on such a discussion, that last
question can look either fair and justified, or unfairly manipulative. That is,
sometimes, one person’s suspicious behavior, dissembling responses, or
otherwise questionable tactics can justify skepticism about, for example,
their honesty or integrity. In such cases, questioning the interlocutor’s
entitlement to inquire about their trustworthiness looks manipulative, or at
best evasive, an attempt to change the topic and question the other
person’s motives rather than submit to further inquiries about their own.
But in other circumstances, it would seem that questioning some things
would destroy the very possibility of a conversation. By analogy, consider
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how Kant pointed out that some elements of cooperative conversation,
such as promising, depend on a basic commitment to telling the truth, and
without at least some confidence in the other person’s honesty, these
elements may well prove impossible (Kant, 1998, p. 15). Likewise for
questions that may challenge the other person’s standing to be taken
seriously.
My point here is to draw attention to the fact that sometimes it seems fair
to challenge another’s standing, and sometimes it does not. Although the
connection might not be the most obvious, it seems to me that this
question is relevant to robot ethics. In particular, the question about when
and why it would be acceptable to interrogate someone’s standing in an
interaction is germane to issues involving the moral considerability of
robots. And the fact that questions that challenge human conversational
partners’ standing are themselves ambiguous is something that I take as
an important starting observation.
But before going further, it would be helpful to clarify my starting point in
this paper. This is the question: When and why do robots count as morally
considerable? Variations on this question have been asked for many
years, ranging from discussions about moral “status” to current
discussions about “robot rights.” In this context, I prefer to speak of moral
considerability, as this strikes me as relatively broad: “rights” presumes a
deontological or legal framework, “status” often invites questions about
consciousness (see, for example, summaries of status debates in Gruen,
2017, and LaBossiere, 2017) , but “consideration” can be due for a variety
of reasons, including but not limited to such concerns. For this project,
then, when I speak of “considerability” I do so to leave open the grounding
of this consideration.
I want to remain open in my initial framing of the issue because I think it is
important to survey the history of the discussion, in order to see where
both plausible and problematic elements can occur. In particular, I think it
is helpful to begin by dividing general strategies for answering the
considerability question into internal and external accounts, following Mark
Coeckelbergh’s lead (Coeckelbergh, 2010). Internal accounts focus on
internal states of the robot (consciousness, sentience, etc.) as justifying
the attribution of moral considerability. External accounts focus on external
features of the robot, such as appearance, and relational features, such as
how its appearance affects human subjects (whether, for example, it
provokes empathy, or allows people to practice prosocial behavior), to
justify moral consideration. What has been missing, I will argue, is
attention to how these concerns fit together. To begin to integrate them, I
turn to accounts of interpersonal relationship in Aristotelian and Confucian
virtue ethical traditions.
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Insides and outsides
Early discussions of ethics in robotics involved questions about what it
would take for a robot to be conscious and hence ethically considerable.
While robot ethicists rarely try to argue that today's robots count as
conscious under any plausible, morally relevant account of
consciousness, puzzles related to this issue continue to arise.
One familiar question runs, “When do robots gain moral status?” This then
naturally leads to the further question: what, if anything, would be an
appropriate test for robot moral status?
Part of the problem is deciding what such a test would measure: common
candidates include rationality (LaBossiere, 2017), interests (Neely, 2014),
consciousness (Levy 2009), or sentience (MacLennan, 2013), or some
other "internal" mental state one takes to be morally relevant. A version of
this question also arises in animal ethics, where the question of what
internal properties confer moral status is of great interest even when the
entities of question seem more likely to have mental lives or subjective
experiences than today's robots (Gruen, 2017). This is sometimes taken to
involve even further complications that arise when creatures with similar
interior lives are widely taken to have different moral statuses—for
example, pigs and domestic dogs are both social, emotional creatures
with similar cognitive abilities, and yet they occupy very different social
and legal positions in many Western countries. This problem might seem
less pressing if one is already committed, for example, to ethical
vegetarianism—the practical problem of convincing others remains, but
those persuaded by, for example, Peter Singer’s or Tom Regan’s
accounts of animal ethics will already be committed to the view that to
distinguish between puppies and piglets is morally unjustifiable (Norcross,
2004; Regan, 2004; Singer, 2009). This does, however, introduce
questions about what might justify treating psychologically similar
creatures differently (Coeckelbergh and Gunkel, 2014, Darling, 2016).
The question is further complicated by issues about what kind of external
observables could count as plausible evidence of mental states, a deep
problem in philosophy of mind. In the field of artificial intelligence, the
Turing Test is sometimes taken to give at least defeasible criteria for
mentality, but its status is highly controversial, and Turing may have taken
the term artificial intelligence to itself be an important means of deflecting
any ethically significant implications being attached to a mechanism that
passes the test, although this has been debated (Turing, 2004; Estrada,
2018). The dual uncertainties of what we ought to measure, and how we
ought to measure it, lead some to argue that an appropriate ethics for our
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treatment of robots ought not presume a perfect measuring tool but should
instead take into account the relative risks of getting an entity's moral
status wrong in both directions: false positives and false negatives
(LaBossiere, 2017; Neely, 2014).
Here, speculative robot ethics intersects with practical concerns of today's
roboticists, as the costs and benefits associated with false positives are of
immediate interest. Research in HRI (human-robot interaction) shows that
people—including informed, technical users—attribute agency,
intentionality, and moral significance to even simple robots, based on cues
like apparently-autonomous movement and the appearance of stylized
faces (Darling, 2012; Scheutz, 2012), and they seem to work by appealing
to non-rational but influential portions of human psychologies, ones that
affect our decision-making and altruistic tendencies (Bateson, Nettle, &
Roberts, 2006; Farah & Heberlein, 2007; Haley & Fessler, 2005).
Risks of these “false positives” include vulnerability to manipulation by
robot manufacturers (Scheutz, 2012) and hackers (Grodzinsky, Miller, &
Wolf, 2015), a tendency to decrease appreciation for genuine agents in
exchange for a placid acceptance of "real enough" (Turkle, 2011),
substitution of robot companions for human companionship (Sharkey,
2014), and a tendency to displace blame from human operators and
manufacturers to the robots themselves, thus allowing human agents to
duck responsibility illegitimately (Bryson, 2010; Sharkey, 2017; Vallor &
Bekey, 2017). These concerns tend to support the idea that we are
justified in questioning whether they ought to be treated as morally
considerable.
However, against conservatism about moral considerability, a number of
considerations make it plausible that these “external” features of robots
might give grounds to take them to be morally considerable, all on their
own. For example, it seems problematic to interrogate real-seeming
person-ish creatures and demand that they prove themselves to have
moral status; this is not an ordinary feature of moral experience and in fact
seems itself somewhat unethical (Coeckelbergh, 2010; Coeckelbergh &
Gunkel, 2014; Gunkel, 2018). That is, it seems appropriate to criticize
someone for questioning apparent moral status. Conceptualizing robots as
subservient, and “dehumanizing” them, can manifest troubling tendencies
toward oppression and domination (Estrada ,2020). Furthermore,
mechanisms that contribute to human tendencies to attribute moral
significance to robots may be valuable and worth protecting, even when
they “misfire” (Darling, 2016, 2017), and sociable robots may be valuable
in part when and because they help us to rehearse and reinforce prosocial
tendencies among human beings (Sullins, 2008), similar to some
psychological benefits of companion animals. These external approaches,
sometimes dubbed “relational” accounts because they focus on (external)
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relations between the entity and human beings with whom it interacts
(Coeckelbergh & Gunkel, 2014), challenge the assumption that the correct
way to assess ethical issues involving non-human entities is to try to
determine which (internal) properties of an entity are necessary and
sufficient for moral status, in order to detect or intuit with some degree of
certainty whether any given entity does so. Instead, they focus on moral
grounds for taking seriously those observable features that, with some
regularity, engage morally significant responses of our own.

Missing pieces
There are risks no matter which strategy we adopt. It looks like the options
are to make ourselves vulnerable to manipulation or to impose
unreasonably high standards for moral consideration that rule out many
genuinely deserving subjects and impair our potential to engage in
relationships. Furthermore, it is unclear how these concerns ought to be
balanced, owing to contested issues that span across a variety of fields in
philosophy, from the moral significance of empathy and emotional
reactions (Darling, 2012; Coeckelbergh, 2018b) to the plausibility of
philosophical “zombies” (Gray and Wegner, 2012). What is missing in
internal-properties accounts, as some have argued (Coeckelbergh and
Gunkel, 2014) is respect for the moral importance of relationships, and
what is missing in relational accounts is an appreciation for the importance
of truth-conditions for beliefs about those things with which we take
ourselves to be related (Nyholm, 2020). Consider the example with which
this paper began: concerns about manipulation and vulnerability are
themselves to be found within relationships even among uncontroversial
instances of persons.
Both “sides,” as I have articulated them here, overlook something
important about the other: the “internal qualities” theorist overlooks,
among other things, the fact that apparent possession of sentience or
consciousness has not resulted in anything like widespread or consistent
ethical protections for non-human animals. Internal qualities, if they
matter, call for a widespread overhaul of current ethical practices, and do
not uncontroversially support ethical status in and of themselves. But more
importantly, they overlook the importance of relations and relationships:
that even a widely-recognized-as-a-person’s moral significance can vary
to another person based on whether that someone is a friend, a relative,
or a stranger—while we might owe basic respect to all those who qualify
as people, someone’s being my child can make a significant difference in
how I ought to spend my time and energy. And furthermore, that even
clear non-persons can have moral significance based on other factors:
work of arts, objects of sentimental attachment (to oneself or others),
religious artifacts (even of someone else’s religion), and so on.
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Meanwhile the “relational” approaches miss the opposite point: that
relationships are not just about how others make us feel, but about how
people interact and respond to each other; become emotionally
interdependent, and open to each other’s perspectives on the world. (This
is of course not true of all relationships—enemies, rivals and so on—but is
characteristic of valuable interpersonal relationships, and to the extent that
other relationships lack this, they seem to be morally problematic.)
Consider, for example, Freya Mathews’ discussion of why relationships
with “pet” animals can be distinctively valuable:
…emotional involvement with creatures who do not share our human goals and
aspirations, our systems of values, enables us to gain an external perspective on
those values. It enables us to appreciate how odd or arbitrary our human priorities
might appear to non-human observers (Mathews, 2007, p. 16).

While something can present itself to us as person-like or even friend-like
via fairly simple visual cues, such as eyespots or particular movement
patterns, like the famous Heider and Simmel animation of two triangles
and a circle (Schroer & Schroer, 2019), moving from “activates
semiautonomous person-detector neural system” to a real relationship
requires opening oneself to another’s point of view and concerns, which is
difficult if the other has no point of view or concerns.
Rather than think we need to choose between an “internal” and an
“external” approach, I think we ought to consider how to integrate them.
Instead of a purely “relational” account, we would do well to start with a
richer account of relationships – including both relations and relata – may
be able to reframe concerns about social robots in light of skepticism, risk,
and vulnerability in relationships. We need to think about when it is
appropriate, and when it would be inappropriate, to challenge their status
versus go along with appearances, and we can take advantage of existing
discussions about appearance and emotion in interpersonal relationship to
do so.

Reasoning in and about relationships
In thinking through responsible management of the inevitable risks posed
by the appearance of relationship, one can take account of the problems
posed by robots and reinforced by debates in animal ethics. Such an
account can shed light on both speculative and immediate concerns of
robot ethics. It can articulate ethically appropriate means of investigating
appearances, within the limits of our epistemic abilities.
That this is so is perhaps best demonstrated by considering the roles of
deception, trust, and honesty in interpersonal relationships.
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These things matter in interpersonal relationships because we care about
more than appearances; more than how someone makes us feel or
whether something is a person. We care about the extent to which
someone’s appearances match their inner states. Thus, some so-called
“relational” externalist accounts miss the mark in thinking that skepticism
about the genuineness of a creature’s appearance is incompatible with
thinking of them as people, or that approaching personish things in a
relational way requires accepting things at face value.
This manifests in different ways in different traditions. For example, in the
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle has the following to say about deception
and friendship:
one might complain of another if, when he loved us for our usefulness or
pleasantness, he pretended to love us for our character. For, as we said at the
outset, most differences arise between friends when they are not friends in the
spirit in which they think they are. So when a man has deceived himself and has
thought he was being loved for his character, when the other person was doing
nothing of the kind, he must blame himself; when he has been deceived by the
pretences of the other person, it is just that he should complain against his
deceiver; he will complain with more justice than one does against people who
counterfeit the currency, inasmuch as the wrongdoing is concerned with something
more valuable. (Aristotle, 1999, p. 140/1165b5)

This focuses on the experience of being deceived and is both critical of a
tendency to self-deception and the deceptiveness of others. And while
Platonic philosophy focuses on metaphysical concerns and the
appearance/reality gap (as for example in the allegory of the cave in his
Republic), Aristotle endorses a commitment to starting from and reasoning
through appearances, preserving them as insofar as possible (Aristotle
1999, p. 100/1145b2-7) He is arguing within the scope of the appearances
that people’s behavior can generate expectations that are ill-matched to
the situation, and that thriving as a person whose wellbeing requires
relationship (p. 119/1155a5-10) requires the ability to situate judgments
based on (temporary) appearances within broader and longer-standing
contexts of reliability and mutual expectations. That is, he can be taken to
be concerned with aligning one’s judgments about internal and external
states, without presuming epistemic access to a reality “behind the
appearances” altogether. We have to grapple with our own (sometimes
involuntary) tendencies to interpret ambiguous data in our favor when
engaging in social relationships, as well as others’ ability to mislead us for
their own ends.
Confucian virtue ethics integrates a concern for the social roles we occupy
into its account of the virtues, which informs how Confucius approaches
the issue of honesty in interpersonal relationships. He speaks to the
importance of being xin if one is to be a virtuous individual in a highly
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social context. What is xin? As Wee argues, although Confucian
translators usually render it as “trust,” xin is really more about one's deeds
matching one's words, out of a sincere commitment to being transparent
to others (Wee, 2011). Confucius is clear that this is not meant to imply
that the person is good overall, since a small-minded stickler can be xin,
but it is an important step on the way to being a virtuous individual. Xin,
Confucius says, will make one’s interactions go better; it is difficult to
achieve, but living up to one’s word conscientiously is a necessary
prerequisite for interpersonal harmony.
In the Analects (15.6), a conversation between Confucius and his student
makes this point especially clear.
Zizhang asked about getting by in the world.
The Master [Confucius] replied, 'In your speech, be dutiful and trustworthy, and in
your conduct be sincere and respectful. In this way, you will always get by in the
world, even if you find yourself in some barbarian state. If your words are not dutiful
and trustworthy, and your conduct is not sincere and respectful, how can you
possibly get along, even in your own region? When standing still, visualize these
principles standing by your side; when riding in your carriage, see them resting
before you on the crossbar. Only then will you get by in the world.”
Zizhang then wrote these words on the end of his sash. (Confucius, 2003, p.
176/Analect 15.6)

This passage helps make clear why Wee differentiates it from the English
word “trust:” xin is not the same thing as interpersonal trust, since xin is
about the individual rather than the relationship. One is xin even amongst
the barbarians. And yet, it is important as a part of the foundation that
makes interpersonal relationships possible.
Whether focused on self-deception and correct interpretation of others’
intentions, or holding oneself to a standard for others, both Aristotelian
and Confucian virtue-ethical traditions, then, emphasize the importance of
accurately discriminating between the mere appearance of friendliness
and the genuine friend, a concern that informs both how one chooses to
invest in interpersonal relationships with others, as Aristotle argues, and
how one conducts oneself in social settings, as Confucius points out. Both
philosophers hold that morally valuable relationships involve emotions, but
consist of much more than mere gut-level reactions to eyespots and
movement.
Both Aristotelian and Confucian virtue ethics also praise the value of
relationships but caution against deceptive appearances. It would seem,
then, that both traditions would be critical of what I have characterized as
“false positives,” mistaking the superficial appearances of social robots
that trigger human social responses for the real presence of people worthy
of relationship.
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However, it does not follow from this that we ought to avoid empathetic or
social responses to these cues, either. Not every engagement of
emotional or social responses that is triggered by a non-person entity
should be taken to be a “false positive.” And on this topic, Confucian
ethics offers advantages over Aristotelian for its sophisticated moral
psychology and discussion of the social conditions and practices that
promote virtue. In particular, Confucian ethics’ emphasis on li, sometimes
translated as “rituals” or “etiquette” but perhaps better understood for our
purposes as structured social practices that facilitate character
development and flourishing relationships, is of use when thinking about
how and when we ought to take robots to be morally considerable, at least
in the absence of clear reason to attribute “internal” states such as
consciousness or sentience.

Confucian resources on emotion-stimulation
Specifically, Confucius and his followers offer detailed discussions of
music and funerals that can be helpful in thinking about social robots and
moral consideration. Music, because it triggers powerful emotional
responses, and funerals, as extensive social practices developed (on
Confucian accounts) in order to show respect to corpses, which trigger
strong emotional responses for the bereaved by reason of their
resemblance to the person that was, and yet which are not conscious or
sentient and (in the naturalistic worldview common among the Confucians)
offer no prospects of becoming so.

Music as tool for cultivating emotion
Confucius praises music for its ability to stimulate emotional responses
and so sensitize people to feel emotions appropriate to the situation. He is
critical of some forms of music for emphasizing what he takes to be the
wrong sorts of responses, preferring, for example, ancient Shao and Wu
music as opposed to the more seductive contemporary Zheng music (E.G.
Slingerland, 2014, p. 73). But he is optimistic about music’s potential for
moral education. At the same time, he does not think one ought to rely on
it to do all of the moral work; when visiting a town in which the
administrator has encouraged all of the citizens to play music, apparently
to excess, Confucius remarks that he is using “an ox-cleaver to kill a
chicken”—a memorable phrase to call out overkill (Confucius, 2003, p.
200/Analect 17.4)
Confucian scholar Mencius follows up on this interest in music as a tool for
moral education, remarking:
The content of benevolence is the serving of one’s parents; the content of
dutifulness is obedience to one’s elder brothers; the content of wisdom is to
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understand these two and to hold fast to them; the content of the rites [li] is the
regulation and adornment of them; the content of music is the joy that comes from
delighting in them. When joy arises how can one can stop it? And when one cannot
stop it, then one begins to dance with one’s feet and wave one’s arms without
knowing it. (Mengzi, 2004, p. 87/4A.27)

We can imagine, then, that a similar defense might be made of social
robots: Without even knowing it, one reacts with empathy or social
engagement, and this can be incorporated via li into a kind of regulated
adornment of our natural tendencies toward empathy and sociality, in
order to develop into better human beings.
Social robots and music are similar in that they both can engage our
emotional responses involuntarily and unreflectively. While in robot ethics
this is taken to raise worries about manipulation, or else treated as valuable
in its own right (as when one treats activation of empathy as good in itself),
by considering how music can involuntarily engage our emotions in a way
that can seem valuable for its own sake; moving with the music becomes
an end in itself. And while music can certainly be used to stir emotions in
the service of other ends, including morally problematic ends, it would be a
mistake to thereby treat it with suspicion simply because it is not under our
voluntary control.
Against worries about manipulation, in fact, the Confucian can point to
music’s tendency to involuntarily draw us in and set us dancing as a
potentially valuable technology to provoke emotional responses as part of
the project of developing desirable human traits. It will not do so all on its
own and too much can be overkill (think of the ox-cleaver!) but can be a
valuable part of a morally enriching life. To the extent that music is morally
valuable, so too can social robots be. And to the extent that we think
music can be morally considerable; worth considering and worth
protecting, without getting into debates about whether it is conscious or
sentient (think about how silly that would be!) we might take robots to
similarly be candidates for a parallel form of moral consideration without
attributing to them “internal” qualities like consciousness.

Funerals as tools for cultivating social dispositions
Another topic in Confucian ethics that bears on moral considerability of
social robots, is, as I have said, discussion of funerals. It is important to
note that Confucius and his followers were agnostic, at best, about an
afterlife, and their arguments framed strictly in terms of life on earth. At
one point in the Analects, his pupil Zilu apparently “asked about serving
ghosts and spirits. The master [Confucius] said, ‘You are not yet able to
serve people—how could you be able to serve ghosts and spirits?’ ‘May I
inquire about death?’ ‘You do not yet understand life—how could you
possibly understand death?’” (Confucius, 2003, p. 115/Analect 11.12) But
even without understanding death, sooner or later we all must deal with
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it—and not just our own, but the deaths of people around us. Chinese
ethics of the time involved extensive debates about the value and
appropriateness of funeral practices, and Confucian scholars articulated a
defense of this form of li that was grounded in the practical and
psychological benefits to human beings.
One particularly prominent defense comes from Confucian scholar Xunzi,
in his essay “On Ritual.” In her paper “From corpses to courtesy: Xunzi’s
defense of etiquette,” which focuses on this work, Amy Olberding identifies
a number of ways that his concerns may be incorporated into modern
ethics.
In contrast to a Kantian approach that emphasizes respect for persons,
Olberding explains,
Xunzi’s defense of etiquette [li] issues from a more prosaic sensibility: the joint
recognition that cooperative, communal life requires that we find human company
appealing and attractive, and that human beings in their natural state are, if not
as a rule then too often for our shared good, unappealing and unattractive to their
fellows (Olberding, 2015, p. 147).

Furthermore, it avoids emphasizing our “natural” or “authentic” impulses,
instead arguing that its value comes from its artificiality. While human
nature left to its own devices can sour us on each other, rituals (broadly
construed to include both funerals and etiquette) can help us to cultivate
dispositions that counter these tendencies while facilitating social
cooperation.
Olberding begins with Xunzi’s discussion of funeral rituals to illustrate the
need for artificial intervention. Funerals are “justified by the corpse’s
‘natural transformation’—that is, its decay—and our responses to it:
Ritually adorning the corpse is a strategy that ‘disguises its hideousness.’”
(Olberding, 2015, p. 150) While eyespots and movement may trigger our
innate social responses, which as we have seen is a concern for robot
ethics, corpses trigger innate feelings of disgust, which counts as a
concern for funeral ethics. What they have in common is that corpses
strongly resemble human beings, in ways that, like robots, bring up social
responses, and responses we do not want to suppress. Olberding
explains,
Where under most conditions we would simply distance ourselves from what
disgusts us, the corpse does not merely disgust but is simultaneously identified as
the person we grieve. It is at once thing and person, a thing we must get rid of and
a person we long to keep but cannot. Corpses are disposal problems with special
features, for the bereaved will neither readily nor easily disidentify the corpse with
the living person it symbolically represents. (Olberding, 2015, p. 151)
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That is, it seems good to identify the corpse with the person lost, even if
one must also face the reality that the person is no longer there. This is
consistent with the externalist point that it can be good to react to social
robots with empathy, even while agreeing with internalists that these
robots lack important internal features, situating both within our experience
as creatures that care for others by way of emotional responsiveness to
appearances while recognizing that appearances are not all that matters.
She explains that on Xunzi’s account, funeral rituals create “conditions
under which corrosive disgust that would undermine affection and respect
cannot find purchase, and ethically fruitful longings and attachments are
affirmed and encouraged.” (Olberding, 2015, p. 152) This is done by using
rituals to shape our emotional responses and habituate us into responding
to other human beings in more cooperative and considerate ways.
At this point, one might be forgiven for thinking that the thrust of Xunzi’s
argument focuses on the individual impact of corpses (or robots) on
human psychologies, such that it might end up being more appropriate to
embrace his approach with some people than others. For example, many
parents have actively solicited “politeness modes” for artificial personal
assistants like Alexa and Siri, in order to help their children practice good
manners and counteract these devices’ tendencies to encourage them to
bark requests at people (Metz, 2018). But perhaps adults are less
suggestible, perfectly capable of partitioning off their treatment of robots
from their treatment of human beings, rendering ritualized shaping of
emotional responses superfluous or paternalistic. But in addition to taking
adults to be capable of struggling with the pull of emotion in the presence
of a corpse even when they understand that the person is no longer there,
in ways that funeral rituals can help with, Xunzi notes that people’s
treatment of others can itself have an influence on others (Xunzi, 2014, p.
257/380-390), and thus we need not only funeral rituals for corpses but
also etiquette to govern our interactions with each other, because the rude
person does not only influence the person to whom they are rude, but
anyone who happens to observe their interaction (Olberding, 2015, p.
156).
Olberding points out that this is “consonant with evidence in empirical
psychology. ...The phenomenon of “emotional contagion.” Thus, “we profit
where our practices manage and regulate the atmospherics of shared
space and social encounter to favor affirmations of fellow feeling and
humanity.” (Olberding, 2015, p. 156) While often criticized for their
artificiality, funerals and etiquette, she says, are “clever strategies for
protection and flourishing” and “‘artificial’ much the way a house is…
shelter from natural elements that would imperil our well-being and, at
their more ambitious, serving our hopes to find ourselves at home with
others in lives that are shared.”(Olberding, 2015, p. 159)
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This highly pragmatic account of the value of emotionally engaging social
robots might sound merely instrumental (we value robots because they
help us cultivate important prosocial dispositions) but this justification is
not appropriate as a motivator of our engagement with them, precisely
because purely instrumentalist interactions with people are themselves
failures of prosocial attitudes. To think of something as a mere tool for
one’s use (even to practice prosocial dispositions) would tend to undercut
its effectiveness, when the disposition it is used to cultivate is one that of
necessity involves direct consideration for and responsiveness to persons.
The ways that this complicates the picture involve both how we view our
relationship to our emotional responses, and how we see ourselves as
relating to others, as the next two sections argue, and ultimately explain
why it can be so difficult in practice to draw clear lines dictating when it is
appropriate to challenge something’s moral standing.

Robots as cultivators of social dispositions
This same line of reasoning we saw with music can be extended to our
treatment of robots: to treat them as morally considerable need not
facilitate “pernicious falsity” but rather an (admittedly artificially induced)
way to cultivate our social selves, both by direct means (as for example by
encouraging us to say “please” and “thank you” and to treat those things
that stimulate altruistic feelings as worthy of attention—because these
feelings are not a scarce resource but dispositions to be extended through
practice) and because of the impact our own treatment of robotics may
have on others. Slate columnist Rachel Withers recently authored an
essay titled “I don’t date men who yell at Alexa,” in which she argues that
verbal abuse of virtual assistants can reveal dispositions and biases that
reflect gender and power imbalances. Her titular decision seems
eminently reasonable to me, because the gendered character of personal
assistants such as Alexa invoke further overtones of misogyny that can be
off-putting to others, an area where it is reasonable to maintain this
distaste for such behavior when we already have an uphill battle to ensure
that people grant women the moral consideration they are clearly owed
(Withers, 2018).
At the heart of both the Confucian theories articulated above, and
contemporary debates about the impact of social robotic technologies on
human beings, is a question about how we relate to our sometimesinvoluntary emotional responses, and, depending on how that question is
answered, what we ought to do about this.
In a discussion of historical trends in European thought, Mark
Coeckelbergh characterizes a divide that emerged between Romanticism
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and Enlightenment rationality (Coeckelbergh, 2018). The Enlightenment
rationalist says emotions distort and misrepresent reality, and so the
perfect reasoner should do away with them. This approach is wellcaptured in a line from Arthur Conan Doyle’s story “A scandal in
Bohemia,” in which the protagonist Sherlock Holmes’s relationship to
emotions and reasoning is described:
All emotions... were abhorrent to his cold, precise but admirably balanced mind.
He was, I take it, the most perfect reasoning and observing machine that the world
has seen, but as a lover he would have placed himself in a false position. He never
spoke of the softer passions, save with a gibe and a sneer. They were admirable
things for the observer—excellent for drawing the veil from men's motives and
actions. But for the trained reasoner to admit such intrusions into his own delicate
and finely adjusted temperament was to introduce a distracting factor which might
throw a doubt upon all his mental results. Grit in a sensitive instrument, or a crack
in one of his own high-power lenses, would not be more disturbing than a strong
emotion in a nature such as his. (Doyle, 2019, p. 163)

By contrast, the Romantics reacted against this framing by
paradigmatically holding that emotions are valuable in themselves,
regardless of how well they track what's going on in the world, and thus
present 'reasons' for action that outweigh what 'reason' would have us do.
But these extremes that some thinkers have inherited from the division are
not the only options. One could, for example, take the view that emotions
should be observed, and can be useful data points, but are not to be taken
as definitive in their own right.1 One might think that emotions are like
small, excitable dogs—when they sound an alert, you should investigate
and see what they're responding to, but exercise detached judgment
about how to ultimately respond, because they can be triggered by both
serious and insignificant stimuli. In a therapeutic context, this can seem
better than either validating every emotional response as worthy of the
action the emotion recommends, or trying to clamp down on emotions via
sheer force of will or denial, but ultimately is aimed at working with
whatever emotions arise, rather than adopting a normative attitude toward
emotions—that is, toward evaluating whether or not one ought to feel a
particular way, or what one should do about an emotion that seems in
some sense inappropriate.
But the Confucian view, which seems to me more nuanced, holds that
emotions are important parts of mature reasoning, but that people need
emotional training in order to be reliable and to reliably direct attention to
what matters. This training occurs through rituals, through music, through
poetry and stories, and is described via gardening metaphors, especially by
1

This is a view often associated with mindfulness practices—I refrain from calling it
“Buddhist” as this would oversimplify the complexities of actual Buddhist theories of
cognition and introspection, see Purser, 2019; for a summary of actual Buddhist
philosophy of mind see Coseru, 2017.
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Mencius (Mengzi, 2004, pp. 2A:6, 6A:6). We start off with promising sprouts,
but they need nurturing and sometimes pruning as well as fertilizing to grow
into dependable parts of the mature person. It is this last framework that I
think is most promising for dealing with social robotics: many of the
emotional and social responses they stimulate in us are important and worth
cultivating, but also need refinement if they are to serve us well in complex
social situations.
We ought not treat our feelings about robots as definitive of their value, nor
do we want to be suspicious of them merely because they provoke
emotional responses and thereby “interfere with reasoning.” We could take
a kind of mindful, detached, playful or ironic view, one that leads to a kind
of one-step-removed emotion-observing, but we can also treat them as
potential cultivators of worthy emotional responses (and therefore also
potentially abusable), following the Confucian framework—they would be
like other rituals or music or stories. To respond to people with appropriate
seriousness means we need to think about the emotional engagement that
this involves, and how to cultivate it, including when not to question it.

Role ethics and robotics
Against concerns that these might still inflate the importance of emotional
responses over the facts about personhood (or lack thereof) attributable to
robots, Confucianism offers another advantage. The sophisticated role
ethics developed in Confucian philosophy can be useful in thinking about
the ethical consideration due a role versus a person, which can be helpful
when the robot occupies a role also filled by human beings, like that of
caregiver, companion, teacher, or housemate.
Confucianism famously involves role ethics2, the idea that in virtue of the
social roles one occupies, one thereby acquires ethical reason to act in
particular ways. These social roles can include professional roles, such as
teacher or student, but also family roles, like parent or child. In particular,
Confucianism is often associated with filial piety, which emphasizes
responsibilities associated with being the child of one’s parents, and in
particular the importance of loving regard, gratitude, and care for one’s
parents. While one might be tempted to think of practicing piety as
instrumentally valuable in the service of caring for the intrinsically valuable
people who occupy this role, for the Confucian, the roles themselves can
be directly valuable, even when the people who fulfill them are not in
themselves deserving of the value assigned to the role. Filial piety can occur
naturally, as it were, when parent-child relationships are harmonious and
unproblematic, but not every parent-child relationship is smooth. In
2

For a survey of Confucian role ethics, see Ramsey, 2016.
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particular, filial piety can be challenging because not every parent is a good
parent. Confucians recognized this, and offered detailed accounts of how
filial piety can be exercised when parents are problematic. For example, the
sage-king Shun was a moral exemplar, but also the child of terrible parents,
who (among other things) repeatedly tried to kill him. Confucian discussions
of Shun’s relation to his parents included obligations to protect himself from
them (Huang, 2012, p. 43) and in some cases circumvention of the formal
practices of filial piety, in order to protect what remained of his emotional
regard for them. David Wong notes, for example, the story of his marriage
as an example of this latter issue. Shun married without his parents’
approval, a violation of the customs of filial piety. When challenged on this,
he explained that if he had gone to them for approval, they would have
denied it simply to hurt him, and then he would have been obligated to obey,
and would have naturally resented them. Instead, in order to prevent this
harm of resentment, he married without their permission, thus preserving
what he could of his relationship with them. (Wong, 2011, p. 8)
While one might not agree with every one of the details of the discussion,
the core idea that we sometimes have to work with people’s limitations in
order to preserve what is valuable about our relationships, and the roles we
acquire in virtue of them, may be familiar to many of us. Because Confucian
role ethics provides a framework for thinking about how to relate to roles
versus people, as Shun related to his parents as vicious people who
nevertheless occupied important roles for him, it can offer conceptual
resources for thinking about the roles robots occupy in relation to us, while
recognizing their limitations in filling these roles. Even if it did not matter to
Shun’s parents as individuals that he thrive, in virtue of his relationship to
them as their child, it was important to him that his parents not harm him or
get in the way of his flourishing—over and above his general concern that
others not so harm or interfere with his happiness. And this can be a subtle
but important point, one perhaps familiar to many children with difficult
parents. Even when actual parental abilities are lacking, recognizing the
importance to oneself as child that one’s parents can have is an important
part of coping with the limitations of these people in one’s life.
One thing that role ethics makes clear is that our relationships to roles can
matter, over and above relationships to people, and this is consistent with
a point that is often overlooked in robot ethics: We err when we assume that
harming a sentient or conscious being is a necessary rather than sufficient
condition for wrongdoing. It would surely be problematic, for example, to
abuse robots that turn out to be sentient. But it is not necessary that they
experience the harm in order for it to be wrong for us to treat them in
particular ways, any more than a corpse needs to feel pain in order for it to
be wrong for us to mutilate it, or (in Xunzi’s very practical example) a small
child need not understand that it is being humiliated in order for it to be
wrong for us to humiliate them—and we need not ignore robots’ non-
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person-ness in order for them to matter to us. And, again, this is not a matter
of merely instrumentally performing respect for children or corpses as
practice for the “real” cases; it matters for how we think of each other to treat
others as worthy of care even when they are not in a position to complain,
which means we ought to take them to be intrinsically valuable in our lived
experiences.

Conclusion
Returning to the example with which this paper opened: challenging
appearances in interpersonal relationship is a tricky business. It can be
entirely appropriate to reject attempts to question them, as the titular
question runs: “how could you even ask that?” Some disposition to take
others at face value is necessary for interpersonal relationships to be
possible, and while current robots’ “faces” may fail to represent internal
conditions necessary to ground nuanced and sophisticated human
interpersonal relationships, we should hold ourselves to standards that
make room for others to fill social roles. At the same time, we may need to
be alert to the possibility that appearances and role occupancy can both
be imperfect indicators of ability, and train and retain the skillset necessary
to navigate deception and disappointment—in interpersonal humanhuman relationships as well as human-robot ones. A nuanced account of
respect for role can make room for healthy skepticism about potentially
misleading or accidentally misleading appearances, without licensing
abusive or disrespectful treatment of the entities that occupy social roles
for us, while endorsing careful attention to both benefits and risks of
emotion-eliciting technologies, so as to develop ethically important
emotional dispositions. One can respect the role a social robot occupies,
without falsely believing its superficial appearances make it a “person” in
all of the ways that might be relevant to philosophers—or to us. This
respect can give us reason to avoid abusing or disrespecting these robots,
and we can give thought to the rituals it would be appropriate to employ
around them, given their effect on our social responses. The emotions
they inspire, from sociality to scorn, can be worthy of consideration as part
of our concern for our own ethical development, and like music or
funerals, they can be constructed and used so as to amplify cooperative
and pro-social emotional dispositions and discourage those emotional
responses that interfere with our ability to live well with others—like
(potentially) frustration, scorn, arrogance, gullibility or superiority.
For example, take the robot funerals that Julie Carpenter has documented
in the U.S. military (Garber, 2013).3 Within a Confucian framework, the
rationale for such a ceremony might turn out to be remarkably similar to
3

I thank an anonymous reviewer at this journal for suggesting the relevance of this case.
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that Xunzi offers for human funerals. While it makes no difference to the
guest of honor, it marks a way for people to honor the significant role the
deceased has played in their lives, and to give their emotion and
attachments space to be felt and recognized without “running wild.” The
roles that life-saving bomb detection and pack robots play in these
soldiers’ lives can be appropriately recognized as valuable and, in virtue of
their connections to human soldiers, responses to their loss can be given
weight in the form of ritual, as part of protecting the social capacities and
human lives in which both humans and robots are embedded.
Thus, robots can turn out to be morally considerable—that is, worthy of
moral consideration—without reducing the value of relationships to
emotional reactivity on our part, as the externalists sometimes suggest,
and leave room for empirical research on, for example, the psychological
mechanisms and effects of empathy, without waiting for robots to become
sentient or conscious, or for us to work out reliable means of determining
that they have done so. Here, the Confucian idea of li as ritual or etiquette
can be especially helpful because it avoids the universality often
associated with moral norms, emphasizing the importance of contingent
social practices within a particular place and culture, which nonetheless
give us a kind of structure for shaping our social selves in response to the
challenges we tend to face within some shared context. By reflecting on
what would count as justifiable rituals for us to practice, and thinking about
how particular reactions accord with other social concerns, we gain tools
to help us navigate when it is appropriate to accept them at face value,
and when to question appearances.
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